X.KOJIRA.IO
Timeline

Kruw

npub1pww7030g95nv9ptfpgfu69jpfxj6pm33xxueztsupwekce45wx4sm6en60
Taxes are a scam. Inflation is a stealth tax. Bitcoin fixes this.
Why did you censor the abbreviation for national socialism?
Be your own bank
Be your own accountant
Be your own lawyer? 😅
Ah we're making progress! Since you ackowledge that Samourai spying on their users is optional, why don't you correct your article?
The existance of privacy preserving BIP157/158 block filters isn't an "opinion". It's a well known FACT:
nevent1qqs9cks066n…
Since this configurable option only creates downsides from changing its default, why should it exist in the first place?
No, that's appeal to popularity fallacy.

Let's say some non-trivial segment of users say their unlucky number is 13. Does that mean Bitcoin Core should support a configuration to censor transactions that contain the number 13 in them?
Mara is still mining transactions below 1 sat/vbyte. They just aren't mining bids as low as 0.1 sat/vbyte, it appears their price floor is 0.5 sat/vbyte.
Why aren't you instructing Bitcoiners that they should fight back by running their own coinjoin coprdinator nodes? Surrender is terrible advice.
nprofile1qqsf80gvd… supports silent payments 😎
nprofile1qqsf80gvd… supports it. You can donate completely anonymously if you coinjoin first.
This is completely backwards. Whirlpool doesn't fix the problem of toxic change, it makes the problem even worse since it creates the toxic change from a self spend transaction (tx0) instead of creating it from a coinjoin where it has the potential to gain unintended privacy by chance:

https://i.imgur.com/G7T83Fq.png
The claims made in this thread include some that are false and presented with no proof or arguments, alongside some useful descriptions of potential attacks and edge cases that can cause less than perfect privacy. Here’s a line-by-line rebuttal:
_____________________

"1) Wasabi's funding and willing usage of chain surveillance companies puts your on-chain data at risk when you use them. This usage of CA could ... lead to harming your privacy directly"
_____________________

This is simply false, Wasabi wallet never puts your on-chain data at risk:

-Your IP address is never linked to your addresses because Tor is used by default
-Your addresses are never linked to each other because client side block filters are used by default.

Any "usage of chain surveillance companies" by coinjoin coordinators would mean a coordinator is BUYING their data, not SELLING data to them since Wasabi is designed not to reveal any user data.

By comparison, Samourai wallet DOES put your on-chain data at risk:

-By default, all of your addresses are linked together (even the private addresses of your equal output coinjoins) and sent to Samourai's server, which becomes a honeypot of data.
-By default, Tor is not enabled.
_____________________

"1a) Usage of CA could also easily be turned into a honeypot where "bad inputs" automatically get sent to mix with only Sybil inputs, providing 0 privacy but not showing that in your client."
_____________________

A malicious coordinator can attempt to Sybil attack a target input no matter what coinjoin protocol is used. WabiSabi is especially resilient to Sybil attacks, while Whirlpool is especially susceptible to them,

It's possible to perform this attack with some sort of reliability on a 5 input coinjoin like Whirlpool, especially if the coordinator knows the xpub of other users in the round, turning those users into unwilling attackers as well. The cost of a Sybil attack in Whirlpool is reduced to a one time payment because an attacker’s mining fees for remixes are paid by the victims of the attack.

In WabiSabi, the potential for this attack is also mitigated by the 150+ input size of the round, requiring an enormous amount of luck and liquid capital to even attempt. The attacker would need to get lucky for the target to register their non private input first in order for the malicious coordinator to know to fill the round with 149 dummy inputs and exclude registration from any unknown inputs. In order for this attack to ever succeed, the malicious coordinator would have to be enormously well capitalized and liquid (coins that are unconfirmed cannot be registered) to control that many UTXOs and pay their mining fees.

With WabiSabi, the target of the attack would be also able to detect the malicious coordinator when they try to register their second input (which would be rejected). With Whirlpool, the target would not be able to detect a malicious coordinator this way since they are limited to registering a single input in a round.

Wasabi 1.0 and 2.0 clients are also able to detect/prevent this attack in an additional way since a unique "Satoshi" Tor identity is used by the client to get the round status, which is not connected to "Alice" Tor identities used for input registration.
_____________________

"2) WabiSabi as a protocol is only a tool for aggregating inputs where each input/output is blinded from the coordinator, and is not in any way a Coinjoin protocol - it is merely the input aggregation portion of one.

As such, the specifics of the WW2 protocol are unclear."
_____________________

It is simply false that WabiSabi is not a coinjoin protocol.

Aggregating inputs privately is a cryptographic advancement made possible by the WabiSabi protocol, but aggregation is not required, you can still register with a single input. By enabling private consolidation, WabiSabi's properties grant the side effect of making outputs that are larger than a smaller single input a potential link since the larger output could have been created from a consolidation of inputs below the output value, not just created by inputs bigger than the output value.

Since input selection and output selection is done by the client instead of the coordinator, there is a specific deterministic process (with added randomness) to get clients to to choose outputs of the same amount by using a frequency table generated from a template of inputs registered to the round and their values: https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2…
_____________________

"3) There is currently *zero* way to verify the privacy provided by a given mixing round in WW2, and even Wasabi themselves don't seem to understand how their "anon score" metric works.

If you can't verify the privacy you get, you *should not trust it*."
_____________________

The privacy metric is verifiable, both implementations consider outputs private by using the same method. WabiSabi participants and Whirlpool participants use the number of other outputs in the coinjoin that share an equal value to determine how private it is. The only way your anonymity score will increase in Wasabi's client is if your output has a value matching others in the round.

Although measuring and quantifying the minimum privacy gain is easy, the dispute among Wasabi contributors themselves is how to quantify the additional privacy gains that are created by the composition and decomposition possibilities of WabiSabi, which is a novel property of the protocol. Since there is no consensus on finding a way to measure the exact privacy gained from these combinations, they are ignored entirely, and do not adjust your score to be any higher.  This means Wasabi clients will always underestimate how private your output is and will never overestimate how private your output is.
_____________________

"4) "Lonely whales" (i.e. those with larger amounts of Bitcoin) can often gain *zero* privacy in mixes and have 100% deterministic links between their inputs and outputs.

Have seen as little as 6 BTC gaining no privacy from mixing rounds."
_____________________

6 BTC significantly surpasses the potential values that can be made private in a Whirlpool coinjoin. The maximum value of Whirlpool inputs is only 0.5 BTC, which is far lower than the 6 BTC whale you observed creating change.  

If a whale output (or any output) gains zero privacy from a round, then the wallet will not identify that output as private. Any non private output can simply be remixed again without paying additional coordinator fees.
_____________________

"5) Due to the client + coordinator not learning amounts chosen by participants in rounds, you can never be sure that a mixing round provides you with any privacy, as it's always possible no one selects the same amounts as you, providing an anon set of 1 (your input/output)."
_____________________

This unlikely (but possible) result will cause the output to register to be remixed.  

Even though this standalone output still gains real privacy in the real world (if it is not the whale), the client is not able to measure this privacy gain, so it just gives it the minimum anon score of 1.
_____________________

"6) The usage "big TX = good privacy" in Wasabi marketing is BS, as the only thing that matters for privacy in a transaction is the potential outputs to match your inputs.

That is really only the outputs that share a denomination with your output, not all outputs in a TX."
_____________________

An output (if it is not the whale) cannot be matched to an input even if there are no other outputs sharing the denomination.

If you think this claim is "marketing BS", then go ahead prove it by identifying the input that created this output:  https://mempool.space/address/bc1qrmmypw3g2ds4aqgh3nqc59q…
_____________________

"7) If the creators of this purported privacy tool don't know how to measure the privacy provided by their protocol, it should raise red flags for you.

Not knowing how your own protocol actually provides privacy opens up so many potential implementation flaws."
_____________________

The minimum privacy gained can be measured, only the maximum privacy gained cannot be measured.  There is no downside to gaining more privacy in the real world than your client is able to detect, quantify, and display.
_____________________

"8) There is a *long* history of tracing of Wasabi's previous implementation due to flaws in protocol and flaws in implementation,
so we should be incredibly wary of trusting privacy claims until 100% proven over time."
_____________________

[Citation needed]  You provided *zero* examples of this "long history of flaws" you claim exist.
_____________________

"9) There remain *zero* post-mix spending tools in Wasabi, something that is absolutely vital to actually gaining  privacy from Coinjoins when spending Bitcoin. Even if the protocol was perfect this would lead to many privacy  issues and ‘foot guns’."
_____________________

This is simply false. You can use Wasabi for post-mix Payjoin transactions.

But WabiSabi is so flexible that you shouldn't settle for "post-mix" tools at all: Since there is no fixed standard denomination set by the coordinator, you can send payments DIRECTLY to the receiver INSIDE a 150-400 input coinjoin transaction so that the receiver never even learns the input addresses or the change address of the sender.

It gets even more incredible.  The key verified anonymous credentials (ecash tokens) issued by the coordinator can be used as a completely private second layer for Bitcoin.  This allows Bitcoin payments to be made so privately that the sender does not even learn the address of the receiver: https://twitter.com/MrKukks/status/1619294492854747138
_____________________

"This thread comes after spending many hours digging into the WabiSabi protocol, their documentation, and speaking with them at length.

I have no personal beef with Wasabi but try to remain open to learning from new approaches and wanted to give WabiSabi a fair shake."
_____________________

I hope that you will use the information you learned from this response thread to issue corrections to the original.
_____________________

"As a note to Thibaud and others I spoke with on the Space last week, that was not merely recon or similar, I genuinely wanted to learn and thought that would be a good place.

Unfortunately I didn't really get much mic time or many questions answered and it felt like marketing."
_____________________

In hindsight, it would have been great if there were time budgeted for an audience Q&A.  Perhaps you can gather questions from your audience and strongest Samourai warriors to ask a WabiSabi expert about on your podcast.
This concern about the possibility of being blacklisted wouldn't explain why you wouldn't want to use the coordinator if you were not blacklisted.

It's like saying your favorite restaurant is McDonald's, but you refuse to ever drive there to eat because you are worried the restaurant will be closed when you get there and you have to go to Burger King right next to it instead.

There is not only one centralized coordinator with Wasabi, unlike Whirlpool which Samourai made closed source in order to try to monopolize Bitcoin privacy as a for profit business. Another Wasabi user posted in Telegram yesterday about how he just made their own coordinator using the open source code from zkSNACKS without permission:

https://nostr.build/i/nostr.build_c7252d1354437d4fe3f1b43…
The implied tradeoff is that there are less occurrences of each standard denomination compared to WW1/Whirlpool which forces every participant to create the same size standard denomination: https://blog.wasabiwallet.io/privacy-guarantees-of-wasabi…

However, this tradeoff is overwhelmingly negated once the round gets large enough; Since there is no 1:1 ratio of participants to standard amounts of a single size like WW1 or Whirlpool, observers have to consider all the possible compositions and decompositions of ANY input and ANY output.

Since zkSNACKS has a minimum of 150 inputs per round (up to 400), the possibilities break your calculator:

https://nostr.build/i/nostr.build_de4ce4c4a892d04a03a44d2…
Doxxic change is NOT a requirement for equal outputs to exist. Wasabi Wallet's coinjoins eliminate traceable change, which entirely solves Whirlpool's issue of creating unspendable non private coins: https://bitcoinmagazine.com/technical/toxic-change-wabisa…
-I mean that anyone with a copy of the blockchain can see those payments were made to the same user since they were merged by that user in a self spend transaction.
-Fair
-WabiSabi has even better privacy than "postmix spending" - You can send payments directly in a coinjoin. The recipient only sees their coins came from some combination of 150-400 inputs and no other information, such as the sender's change.

At the pinnacle of two way transactional privacy, WabiSabi enables discreet payments using key verified anonymous credentials . This means that a recipient can accept coins without even the sender knowing what their Bitcoin address is: https://twitter.com/MrKukks/status/1619294492854747138

Wasabi has even better remixing incentives than Whirlpool does: In addition to remixes being free of coordinator fees, change mixing is ALSO free as well. Whirlpool has backwards remixing incentives because sybil attackers have zero time preference when it comes to waiting in line to remix, placing legitimate users who want to gain privacy at an economic disadvantage to attackers.

I don't see any technical issues with Shinobi's article other than it's now outdated with the release of Wasabi 2.0/WabiSabi. You can find a brand new comparative analysis here: https://bitcoinmagazine.com/technical/toxic-change-wabisa…
This WabiSabi coinjoin has 5 inputs for 0.05000000 and 8 outputs for 0.05000000 - mempool.space/tx/01a1a055719129397fb8344b5a09e6cfe72868c8e1d750e621d8b580c96bf77b

Since it provides even greater privacy than any 1:1 Whirlpool coinjoin can, what do you call that? 160% entropy?
Whirlpool leaves deterministic links because it peels the change during the tx0 used to create sized equal outputs. I just unmixed the Whirlpool transaction from your screenshot to reveal the change: https://mempool.space/tx/323df21f0b0756f98336437aa3d2fb87…

Address bc1qgwv9hn979rex0rhfp3cknfdkyrgk04493gclvv belonging to Whirlpool input 1 created 0.01346981 BTC in traceable change which has 100% deterministic links to bc1qjy3zud5c7qypvgccgvptvaxkcsg6g4jl3u4tdy

Address bc1q528pyda90y4j9nuqrcm65rlxz9txljtn208dqm belonging to Whirlpool input 3 created 0.01971146 BTC in traceable change which has 100% deterministic links to bc1q50akm6ggcwgjext09tuz0rcl6cya2huu70pef4

Feel free to post any other Whirlpool tx ids and I'll unmix them too.