"you are guaranteed to agree with everyone who has been online as often as you are"
I think it's not exactly that they need to be online as often as I am. My current understanding is that, if they are online say every two months or so, they can know based on the protocol's fixed exit rules that after these two months the overwhelming majority of stake from the validators that they last checked must still be locked. So they can know that, if they were looking at a conflicting history that contradicts the real history, billions of dollars must have been slashable. So checking every two months gives you that kind of certainty. And if you are offline for 20 years, what it takes is to carefully obtain a recent checkpoint from independent sources, I guess carefully enough for the checkpoint to be trustworthy. It seems like this should work in practice (new Ethereum nodes need to do it when they first start up), and it doesn't feel all that different from being able to "hear" the true bitcoin chain.
"even if they dont unstake, they can share a fake history with a zk system without making their signatures public so they cant be slashed"
This just seems to mean that it's not such a good idea to accept zk proofs as verification, which you don't have to do. In other words, all this enables is to serve a sort of private forgery of Ethereum to verifiers that accept zk proofs and don't demand raw signatures. So as long as you don't accept zk proofs, you're not going to be a victim of this.
"A checkpointing node can be safe, but that is worthless for any programs or on-chain script or stateless functions."
Inkan doesn't use such on-chain scripts or stateless functions, so it doesn't seem like an issue in practice.
"But also, why would i accept ethereum limitations when i dont have to?"
I'm still trying to figure out if the alternative has real advantages. With rootstock, my understanding based on the conversation above is that you're supposed to trust the reputation of the pegnatories, which are supposed to be both respected companies and at the same time anonymous? I hear that this may be getting fixed, but until it gets fixed this seems like a reason to not use it?
Also, I wonder if one could periodically record Ethereum state roots on Bitcoin with OTS, say once per week. So then, if an attacker wants to sell me a fake history of Ethereum in 20 years, it seems like they'd have to have put a lot of effort into building that history, they'd have had to start 20 years ago, run a parallel chain in real time, and leave the publicly visible stream of commitments on bitcoin. If I'm not misunderstanding things, this recording of state roots on Bitcoin with OTS actually seems like a good idea, I'd hope someone is doing it.
I think it's not exactly that they need to be online as often as I am. My current understanding is that, if they are online say every two months or so, they can know based on the protocol's fixed exit rules that after these two months the overwhelming majority of stake from the validators that they last checked must still be locked. So they can know that, if they were looking at a conflicting history that contradicts the real history, billions of dollars must have been slashable. So checking every two months gives you that kind of certainty. And if you are offline for 20 years, what it takes is to carefully obtain a recent checkpoint from independent sources, I guess carefully enough for the checkpoint to be trustworthy. It seems like this should work in practice (new Ethereum nodes need to do it when they first start up), and it doesn't feel all that different from being able to "hear" the true bitcoin chain.
"even if they dont unstake, they can share a fake history with a zk system without making their signatures public so they cant be slashed"
This just seems to mean that it's not such a good idea to accept zk proofs as verification, which you don't have to do. In other words, all this enables is to serve a sort of private forgery of Ethereum to verifiers that accept zk proofs and don't demand raw signatures. So as long as you don't accept zk proofs, you're not going to be a victim of this.
"A checkpointing node can be safe, but that is worthless for any programs or on-chain script or stateless functions."
Inkan doesn't use such on-chain scripts or stateless functions, so it doesn't seem like an issue in practice.
"But also, why would i accept ethereum limitations when i dont have to?"
I'm still trying to figure out if the alternative has real advantages. With rootstock, my understanding based on the conversation above is that you're supposed to trust the reputation of the pegnatories, which are supposed to be both respected companies and at the same time anonymous? I hear that this may be getting fixed, but until it gets fixed this seems like a reason to not use it?
Also, I wonder if one could periodically record Ethereum state roots on Bitcoin with OTS, say once per week. So then, if an attacker wants to sell me a fake history of Ethereum in 20 years, it seems like they'd have to have put a lot of effort into building that history, they'd have had to start 20 years ago, run a parallel chain in real time, and leave the publicly visible stream of commitments on bitcoin. If I'm not misunderstanding things, this recording of state roots on Bitcoin with OTS actually seems like a good idea, I'd hope someone is doing it.
